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Relevance of research topic is due to the 
ability to use tax incentives as a tool of industri-
al policy, for example, supporting of priority 
sectors and activities. Despite the distortions that 
tax incentives introduced in the market resource 
distribution mechanism, tax incentives can be 
used as tool for achieving industrial policy. In 
this case, the government consciously relies on 
the generation of distortions in the market re-
source distribution mechanism, because the 
government is interested in increasing of re-
sources flow in the industry, which get tax in-
centives [1]. 
In the Russian Federation, the concept of 
tax expenditures in practice has not been ap-
plied. Tax incentives are always available in 
Russia for an indefinite period and without eval-
uation of the relevant expenditures. Also, the 
effects appearing from the provision of certain 
tax incentives have never been evaluated quanti-
tatively. The efficiency of tax incentives has not 
been evaluated also. As a result, the number of 
tax incentives in Russia increases every year, 
but the government and society do not have any 
exact data on the budget losses related to the 
provision of tax incentives. 
A budget formalization of these processes 
in line with the generally accepted concept of 
tax expenditures has been long overdue. But just 
two years ago a difficult task regarding the op-
timization of tax incentives has been set for the 
first time before the Ministry of Finance in the 
government document "Guidelines for the tax 
policy of the Russian Federation for 2012 and 
the planning period of 2013-2014" [6]. In par-
ticular, it is necessary to develop a practice of 
impact assessment of the tax incentives that 
would allow to make decisions about their re-
newal or termination, as well as a system of es-
timating the loss of fiscal revenues resulting 
from tax incentives for the purpose of their ac-
counting as a tax budget expenditure in the 
budgets planning processes and budgets perfor-
mance reports. In this case, the task is accompa-
nied by a target setting of the Russian Govern-
ment that in the medium term a draft budget law 
for the next year at all levels of state power and 
local self-government has to be accompanied by 
a report indicating budget "tax expenditure" and 
their efficiency.  
Taking into account that this problem in 
our country (and in general in the former Soviet 
Union) has not been worked out either in theory 
or in practice, the possibility of any objective 
assessment of all tax expenditures and evalua-
tion of the efficiency of all tax incentives within 
the time frame specified seems to be unrealistic. 
And this complex (which requires appropriate 
analysis and evaluation) is significant, if we un-
derstand privileges in a broader context as any 
tax incentive mechanisms. According to prelim-
inary estimates of the Ministry of Finance, the 
total number of tax incentive mechanisms (privi-
leges and exemptions) amounts to 191 points, 60 
of them – regarding the income tax on profits, 
80 – regarding the value-added tax, 20 – regard-
ing the property tax, 16 – regarding the land tax, 
12 – regarding the income tax on mineral extrac-
tion and 3 – regarding the fees for the use of 
fauna and water biological resources.  
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Significant impediments to the solution of 
this problem in Russia are, firstly, the methodo-
logical vacuum in the identification and evalua-
tion of tax expenditures, as well as in evaluating 
the effects and efficiency of the use of different-
directed tax incentives, and secondly, the lack of 
an organizational system, which would monitor 
and assess these indicators. In fact, even the fol-
lowing question has not yet been answered: who 
and how will be solving this task? 
In this article authors will try to identify 
some methodological solutions for the task of 
estimation of tax expenditures and the efficiency 
of tax incentives in Russia, apart from the orga-
nizational and technical aspects of the problem. 
As known, tax incentives are not the ideal 
instrument of state regulation and stimulation of 
priority processes. Significant use of tax benefits 
leads to a lower neutrality of the tax system, in-
creases the cost of tax administration, and as a 
result - reduces the efficiency of the tax system, 
differentiates the tax burden between different 
industries and categories of taxpayers, and there-
fore, reduces the system's fairness and compli-
cates the construction of taxes and the system in 
general. An alternative tool is the direct gov-
ernment financing (subsidies, grants, loans), 
which often demonstrates greater flexibility and 
stimulation targeting.  
The competition between the instruments 
of tax and fiscal stimulation is obvious. It makes 
it necessary to give preference to one or another 
instrument. But this choice has to be made not 
on the basis of theoretical reasoning and qualita-
tive assumptions, as it is being done in Russia 
now, but it has to be made on the basis of com-
parative analysis of the alternative instruments 
efficiency and quantitative estimations (and not 
only direct estimations, but also side-effects). It 
should be noted that in Russia the use of fiscal 
stimulation instruments has long been accompa-
nied by more or less effective control of their 
expenditure and evaluation of the efficiency of 
their use. The use of tax incentives is burdened 
only by the tax authorities' control procedures, 
quantification of tax expenditures and evaluation 
of their performance in Russia, unlike most de-
veloped countries, is still not being carried out.  
The basis for the solution of these prob-
lems in Russia should be made up from the 
works of the founders of the assessment practic-
es of the tax expenditures in the United States 
[18, 11, 19, 14, 13, 22, 20, 7, and others). The 
studies of the best practices of tax expenditures 
assessment in the United States and OECD 
countries are also extremely important [10, 17, 
9, 15]. 
A methodological approach to the as-
sessment of tax expenditures and evaluation of 
the efficiency of their implementation in Russia 
will then be proposed. However, together with 
that we want to emphasize that the originality of 
the approach is related only to the methods of 
costs and efficiency estimation. The essence of 
the approach is based on the famous "concept of 
tax expenditures" [18]. The positive practice of 
using this concept in the USA and OECD coun-
tries during 40 years confirms the need to follow 
the developing economies in line with this con-
cept.  
In general, the assessment of the costs and 
the assessment of their efficiency are the two 
independent and large-scale problems, but they 
are consistently connected: the second problem 
cannot be solved without the first. In addition, 
these two problems have different scales of solu-
tion. They are necessary for assessment of tax 
expenditures and their efficiency in the whole 
country, and also for estimation by industry, 
regions, and municipalities, as well for estima-
tion of each of tax incentives (or type of tax ex-
penditures). Together with this the solution of 
the first as well as of the second problem is con-
nected with some issues that are not solved even 
by those countries that have been practicing the 
concept of tax expenditures for a long time, not 
to mention those who have recently joined or are 
only going to join the process. 
It is necessary to make another note on 
better understanding of tax expenditures.  
The founder of the concept of tax expend-
itures S. Surrey argued that any tax is made up 
of two elements (parts). The first part is the 
structural norm, which is necessary for the nor-
mal functioning of the tax. The second part are 
the norms introducing special incentives. He 
wrote that "these provisions, often called tax 
incentives and tax subsidies represent deviations 
from the normal tax structure and are designed 
for particular industries, activities or groups of 
taxpayers. They take many forms, such as per-
manent exclusion from taxable income, deduc-
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tions, deferred tax liabilities, tax credits and spe-
cial tax rates. Whatever form they take, these 
deviations from the normative tax structure are 
the government expenditures on exempt activi-
ties or groups of taxpayers and made through the 
tax system rather than through direct expendi-
tures, loans, or other forms of state assistance 
[18, 19].  
As known, there are many definitions of 
tax expenditures - almost every country has its 
own. T. Malinina has conducted scrupulous 
analysis of these definitions (we do not repeat it) 
and identified four distinctive characteristics [3]. 
Tax expenditures are: 
loss of tax revenue, so they lead to lower 
budget revenues; 
appear from the tax incentives and ex-
emptions relative to the base (normative) tax 
structure; 
used for the realization of the goals of na-
tional social and economic policy; 
an alternative to direct government ex-
penditures. 
In our opinion the first two features are 
seen as really necessary to identify tax expendi-
tures, and the other two are redundant. But it 
takes one more - an additional feature - creation 
of any advantages for certain activities or groups 
of taxpayers. This is a very important feature, 
because it allows considering the basic structure 
of taxes as one that did not originally contain 
any advantages for certain activities or groups of 
taxpayers, representing some ideal theoretical 
tax construction.  
However, the OECD [10] recommends 
distinguishing between the basic and normative 
tax structure. If the basic structure of taxes 
should demonstrate uniqueness and universality 
for the different countries, the normative struc-
ture of taxes should reflect the national identity 
of the tax, i.e. those rules which are recognized 
as essential parts of the considered tax in the 
country, although those rules are not established 
in the framework of the basic structure. And, 
accordingly, these rules cannot be considered as 
tax expenditures in this country. This distinction 
is a very important and promising feature of the 
process of adaptation of the basic theoretical 
structure of taxes to the existing national prac-
tice of their application, and as a result – of a 
more precise definition of the standard against 
which national identification of tax expenditures 
and a more precise calculation is made. 
For example, the basic structure of the in-
come tax, as it is known, is considered to be the 
comprehensive income Schanz-Haig-Simons 
model. At least, S. Surrey insisted on it. This 
model provides for taxation of the difference 
between revenues and expenses incurred from 
obtaining these revenues. However, this model 
provides for taxation in equal measure of all in-
come from all sources: salary, income from 
business activities, capital income (dividends, 
interest, rents), inheritance, gift, transfers from 
the budget (pensions and social assistance), im-
puted rent for the use of your own home, goods 
produced and consumed in the household or 
your own company, and other income. Such a 
model of the tax is unlikely to be administered 
in practice. 
As a normative structure of Russian in-
come we can consider taxation in various de-
grees (different rates applied) of different types 
of income, and the taxation of one part of the 
total income according to the model Schantz-
Haig-Simons [1, 2, 4]. In particular, the taxation 
of the following is excluded from full income: 
the imputed rent for the use of own housing, 
goods produced and consumed in a household or 
a private firm. Thus most often only those parts 
of income are excluded, which are almost im-
possible to administer. Accordingly, if the nor-
mative structure of tax (and not the base tax 
structure) is used as a standard these deviations 
should not be treated as tax expenditures (incen-
tives). Thus, we offer the following definitions. 
The basic tax structure is a set of structur-
al elements (rules), that provides a such tax con-
struction, which does not produce any benefits 
for certain activities or groups of taxpayers. 
The normative tax structure is a set of 
structural elements (rules) and deviations from 
them, that provides a tax structure that is 
adapted to the practical implementation in the 
current national tax administration system and 
thus is most relevant to the principle of minimiz-
ing the administrative costs. 
Tax expenditures are losses of tax reve-
nues of the budget system connected with the 
application by the legislation of various devia-
tions from the normative tax structure, which in 
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this case provide some benefits to certain types 
of activities or groups of taxpayers. 
 
Evaluation of tax expenditures 
Thus, assessment of tax expenditures in 
Russia should be made for a separate article (tax 
incentives), for a particular tax, by type of tax, 
for all taxes and fees. A sequence of estimations 
of tax expenditures for a specific tax is given 
below. This assessment should include several 
successive operations: 
first, the development of the normative 
structure of the tax in the context of all its major 
elements (of taxpayers, the object of taxation, 
tax base, tax rate, the tax period, the order and 
timing of payment) 
secondly, completing a list of deviations 
from the normative structure of the tax (that 
deviations thus will be the types of tax expendi-
tures); 
thirdly, the development of a method of 
quantitative assessment of tax expenditures and 
the way of their assessment on practice; 
fourth, the preparation of the statisticaly 
quantifiable indicators, which are necessary for 
quantitative assessment by the selected method 
and way; 
fifthly, an assessment of tax expenditures 
on this tax. 
Overall assessment of tax expenditures 
will be the result of adding quantitative estima-
tions of these expenditures for the full range of 
Russian taxes and fees. 
As to the choice of the estimation method 
of tax expenditures, the OECD Review of the 
best practices (Best, 2004) suggests the possible 
use of three methods. 
1. Assessment of tax expenses based on 
income loss. This method involves the assess-
ment of tax expenditures as the amount of tax 
revenue that the budget system will not receive 
as a result of (or loses as a result of the action) 
of any incentives. 
2. Assessment of tax expenditures based 
on reduced income. This method involves the 
assessment of tax expenditures as the amount of 
tax revenue that the budget system can receive 
as an additional result of the proposed cancella-
tion of incentives. It provides a fairly complex 
accounting of economic agents behavioral ef-
fects due to the abolition of incentives. 
3. Assessment of tax expenditures based 
on equivalent costs. This method involves the 
assessment of tax expenditures as the sum of the 
direct costs of the budget, which must be paid to 
all taxpayers who use incentives so that their 
total income would be the same as when using 
this incentive. 
Most practical relevance is the method of 
income loss. According to experts [20], it is the 
most simple and reliable method. A practical 
way of calculating the tax cost of this method is 
reduced to the following steps. To assess the 
existing incentives one should consider the dif-
ference between the amount of tax that would 
have been obtained in the absence of the ana-
lyzed tax incentives, and the actual amount of 
the tax, which comes to the budget system in 
terms of the incentives.  
 
Evaluation of annual tax expenditures 
based on the analyzed incentives 
The formula for this calculation will be 
the following: 
/ ,
t i i i i
w iTE TI TI ICTA ICTH       
where i  – year, of the given incentives' intro-
duction; 
tTE – tax expenditures i-th year; 
/
i
w iTI  – the sum of tax revenue from tax-
payers using this incentive, calculated in the ab-
sence of incentive in i-year (if data are used by 
i-1, they need correction and reduction to the  
i-th year); 
iTI – the sum of tax revenue from tax-
payers using this incentive, calculated in terms 
of providing incentives in the i-th year; 
iICTA – the increasing of the tax admin-
istration costs due to additional costs of adminis-
tering state incentive in the i-th year; 
iICTH – the increasing of the tax har-
monization costs due to additional costs for the 
use of taxpayers' incentives in the i-th year. 
 
Evaluation of tax expenditures for the 
period analyzed incentive 
For the purpose of tax incentive efficiency 
evaluating the tax expenditures should be eva-
luated not for one year but for period from its 
establishment to the display of effect - t. Then 
all parameters are summarized by year. In addi-
tion, for comparability they are brought to the 
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same point in time by discounting. The simpli-
fied formula would look like: 
/
1 1 1 1 1
,
t t t t t
t i i i i
w i
i i i i i
TE TI TI ICTA ICTH
    
         
where t  – the period of time from the estab-
lishment to the end of the display of effect of 
this incentive; 
1
t
t
i
TE

 – tax expenditures of the period t; 
/
1
t
i
w i
i
TI

  – the sum of tax revenue from 
taxpayers using this incentive, calculated in the 
absence of incentive of the period t; 
1
t
i
i
TI

  – the sum of tax revenue from 
taxpayers using this incentive, calculated in 
terms of providing incentives of the period t; 
1
t
i
i
ICTA

 – the increase of the tax ad-
ministration costs due to additional costs of ad-
ministering state incentive of the period t; 
1
t
i
i
ICTH

 – the increase of the tax har-
monization costs due to additional costs for the 
use of taxpayers' incentives of the period t. 
Taking into account the time lag of the in-
centive action and the costs of tax administration 
increases the accuracy of the estimation. But 
even taxation expenditures calculated by such a 
complicated way will be not exact. The main 
sources of these errors are: 
this method takes into account only the 
primary effects of tax incentives, it is not possi-
ble to take into account its secondary effects on 
changes in the tax base, in particular, due to 
changes in the behavior of recipients of incen-
tives; 
enability of accurate determination of the 
amount of the tax that the state loses by giving 
exemptions to taxpayers, especially if this ex-
emption is valid for a long time; 
the complexity of an accurate assessment 
of time t can lead to using as a time t the period 
of incentives exemption or any extended period 
( 5-6 years), when the effect of benefits must 
clearly appear. All these assumptions will re-
duce the accuracy of the estimation; 
the precise estimation of the increase of 
the tax administration costs and tax harmoniza-
tion costs is a costly and difficult task, simpli-
fied procedures will not consider these indica-
tors. 
So the simplified formula for calculating 
the tax expenditures for the period would have 
the form: 
/
1 1 1
.
t t t
t i i
w i
i i i
TE TI TI
  
     
 
Initial requirements for assessing the 
incentives efficiency 
Significant problems arise in formulating 
this methodology. Evaluation of tax expendi-
tures has been learned by most developed coun-
tries (this process has been improved there for 
decades, especially in the USA), but adequate 
assessment of the efficiency of these tax expend-
itures still has not been elaborated. Moreover, 
there are opinions that a scientifically based me-
thodology for evaluating the efficiency of incen-
tives is extremely difficult to create. There are 
several reasons. Let`s formulate them. 
First, during the provision of incentives it 
is impossible to predict how the process of its 
shifting in each case will end, who will get this 
benefit, who will be the final beneficiary of it. 
The shifting processes in the taxation are diffi-
cult for studying and exact description in gener-
al. All this applies also to the incentives shifting. 
Even a long-term operation of an incentive 
sometimes doesn’t allow identifying who is the 
final beneficiary, predicting its future behavior 
and carrying out its planning. So it is impossible 
to plan who would bear the newly introduced 
incentives. This problem is not significant for 
the tax incentives for individuals (the tax on per-
sonal income, transport and property), as op-
posed to tax incentives from legal entities. For 
example, the incentive in form of accelerated 
depreciation is given to a particular enterprise. 
This company reduces its liability on income 
tax, but doesn’t spend its freed funds on pur-
chasing fixed assets, and spend them, for exam-
ple, on increasing the salaries of the employees. 
Thus, the final beneficiary of these incentives 
suddenly becomes a person to whom this privi-
lege was not intended. 
Second, the time lag before the affect ap-
pears after the introduction of appropriate incen-
tives is not certain, which (lag) may be specific 
for each incentive, so it is not clear when the 
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expected effect of incentives will be expe-
rienced. It should be noted that the existence of 
a significant time lag between the introduction 
of the incentives and the real impact of its ac-
tions is a characteristic feature of this type of 
preferences. Identification of the time lag is re-
quired to adequately relate the cost of the rele-
vant tax period (year) to the corresponding ef-
fect (fiscal, economic, social) of the period, in 
which the effect becomes visible. Correct time 
correlation of tax expenditures and effects is a 
necessary requirement (if it comes about an ade-
quate assessment) for an adequate assessment of 
incentives. 
For example, the investment tax credit is 
given for promotional activities of the company 
in the years i-th and i +1, respectively. Let’s 
suppose that the process of implementing covers 
a two-year period of the credit, but a different 
kind of effect will occur with different time lags 
due to objective time processes. The real expan-
sion of the tax base will start much later - after 
commissioning works, approaching to the 
planned production capacity, debugging logis-
tics and distribution operations, etc. Thus, in-
crease of the tax revenue actually will start, for 
example, in the 4-th year, and the increase of the 
living standards of the area will be seen with a 
greater lag of 5-6 years. How should we relate 
tax expenditures and effects in this case? If one 
make all assessments relating to the year of 
these costs incurrence, the effect will be nega-
tive as well as efficiency, but if the time lag is 
identified correctly, the evaluation of the effi-
ciency and outcome may be fundamentally dif-
ferent. One basic conclusion can be made: effi-
ciency of the tax incentives may be defined only 
for a full period t - from its introduction to the 
end of the action (although this conclusion can 
be also discussed because the effects can also 
occur after the application of the incentives). 
This requirement will be very important in the 
transition to total determining of the period of 
the incentives’ action and their effectiveness 
evaluation during their limited use period with a 
following obligatory examination of their exten-
sion feasibility. 
Third, besides identification and account-
ing the time lag under the circumstances of a 
significant inflation the problem of the different 
cost of tax expenditures and the corresponding 
effect (fiscal, economic, social) of the period 
arises. It is necessary to reduce the values being 
compared to the same period of time by dis-
counting.  
Fourth, it is not always clear how much 
the resulting effect of the introduction of the 
incentives will be free of influence from the ac-
tions of others (objective and subjective) factors 
that lead to the formation of the same effect, 
regardless of the application of the privilege. 
Thus it is required to separate the effect of in-
centives from the effect produced by the action 
of a general economic process and other eco-
nomic instruments: stimulating (budget subsi-
dies, for example) and other regulatory. 
For example, how can we cleanse the ef-
fect of the application of the incentives in the 
form of exemption for 3 years from the tax on 
property of organizations in relation to the new-
ly commissioned facilities with high energy ef-
ficiency and the effect of the introduction of the 
same facilities as a result of the overall scientific 
and technological progress and the natural desire 
of the company to reduce their costs for electric-
ity. In fact, the approach to such cleansing of the 
effect should be a three-step algorithm. In the 
first step it requires the initial identification of 
the effect of newly high energy efficiency facili-
ties, which is achieved without the action of the 
incentives. In the second step - the identification 
effect achieved under the same terms but with 
using tax incentives. Finally, the third step – 
obtaining a purified effect by subtracting from 
the effect achieved under conditions of actual 
incentives and effect that would be achieved 
under the same conditions, but without incen-
tives.  
Fifth, it is important to consider the 
process of interdependence of some tax bases, 
which leads to the fact that the tax incentive for 
one can influence the change of revenues for 
other taxes to which this incentive was not in-
troduced. Thus, incentives administered by a 
specific tax can also affect a different tax due to 
the interpenetration of the tax bases. For exam-
ple the tax base for the personal income tax and 
social contribution and income tax, business 
property tax, and transportation taxes are inter-
dependent. For example, the incentive of the 
income tax in the form of accelerated deprecia-
tion reduces not only the income tax in the early 
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periods of equipment using, but also deform ob-
ligations of the enterprise for the property tax, as 
the residual values begin to be measured nonli-
nearly. This process can bring a significant dis-
tortion into the determination of the tax incen-
tives efficiency (monetary, fiscal). Interdepen-
dence of tax bases on the value added tax and 
profit is more obvious, so any benefit to the val-
ue added tax will deform the profit obligations 
of the enterprise. 
The problem of the tax expenditures effi-
ciency measuring requires finding the adequate 
indicators of tax incentives. The Russian prac-
tice of assessment is very inferior and methodo-
logically undeveloped. It is formed in a pioneer-
ing manner at the municipality level, and some-
times – at the level of the subjects of the Russian 
Federation. In this case, regional and local prac-
tice of incentives assessment is based on a "ran-
dom walk". After analyzing more than 20 of 
these techniques, one can make the following 
conclusions, which are not comforting. 
1. There are no typical methods. Every 
municipality is developing their own indicators 
and way of incentives selection for their use. 
2. In general fiscal and social efficiency 
indicators are measured, the first - quantitative-
ly, the second - qualitatively. 
3. Efficiency evaluation is often replaced 
with the estimation of annual effect as some 
gross indicator, for example, the tax base in-
crease as a result of the incentives. 
4. These techniques do not consider any 
of the above requirements for assessing the effi-
ciency. 
 
The essence of the proposed approach 
It is offered to evaluate the efficiency of 
tax incentives proceeding from the definition of 
the economic, social, fiscal and budgetary effi-
ciency. It is important to understand that calcu-
lations for different types of efficiency of the 
aggregate activity of tax incentives are not very 
needed (except to prove the efficiency of tax 
incentives as a whole). It is important to eva-
luate the efficiency of every specific incentive, 
in some cases – of a group of incentives that 
focus on recurrent or unidirectional effects. Also 
we do not take into account factors of taxes 
shifting, but it is offered to consider the time lag 
of the incentives, inflation, the process of the tax 
bases interaction, as well as the presence of oth-
er factors that influence the receipt of this effect.  
In addition, it is important to understand 
that during the introduction of incentives all 
kinds of effects should not become apparent. 
They will still appear, but their value and even 
the direction is different. And we cannot claim 
only the positive evaluations of the effects of 
any specific incentives (excluding the effect on 
the budget). Therefore, different effects should 
be considered, because the objectives of each 
different incentive are different, so the situation 
when the incentives achieve just one or two 
kinds of effect including a budgetary one is 
normal. This incentive shall be considered effec-
tive. We want to offer an original methodologi-
cal approach to the definition of the relevant 
types of effects and the efficiency of tax incen-
tives. 
 The fiscal impact of the tax incentives 
should be a subsequent increase in tax revenues 
over the current tax expenses. Increase in tax 
revenues is the difference between the sum of 
tax revenue from a number of interdependent 
taxes, which is calculated in terms of incentives 
submitted in the period when a real effect from 
the action of the incentives takes place, and the 
sum of tax revenues in the absence of incentives 
in a period of the same duration before their in-
troduction. All indicators are considered for the 
period t, they should be discounted to the same 
period of time. If the desired value is positive 
and exceeds the sum of tax expenditures (i.e., 
the budget revenues exceed the expenditures on 
incentives provision - the loss of the budget), the 
provision of this incentive has a fiscal effect, 
otherwise – no:  
1
;
t
t t
i
FE TE

  
/
1 1
,
t t
t i i
w i
i i
FE TI TI
 
    
where tFE – fiscal effect of tax incentives; 
t – the period of time from the introduc-
tion to the end of action of the effect of this in-
centive; 
/
1
t
i
w i
i
TI

 – the sum of tax revenue from 
taxpayers using this incentive, calculated in the 
absence of incentives over the period t; 
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1
t
i
i
TI

 – the sum of tax revenue from tax-
payers using this incentive, calculated in terms 
when incentives are provided over the period t. 
Fiscal efficiency of tax incentive is the ra-
tio of the fiscal effect of the provision of incen-
tives received in the period t, when a real effect 
from the action of the incentives appears to the 
tax expenditures in the same period t 
/
1 1
1 1
,
t t
i i
w i
i i
fiscal t t
i i
i i
TI TI
FE
Ef
TE TE
 
 

 
 
 
 
where fiscalEf  – fiscal efficiency of the tax in-
centive; 
1
t
t
i
TE

 – tax expenditures on this incen-
tive of the period t. 
If Ef fiscal < 1, then the analyzed tax incen-
tives are inefficient. If Ef fiscal = 1, then increase 
of taxes incomes is equal to tax expenditures,  
so this incentives is fiscally neutral. And if  
Ef fiscal > 1, an increase of taxes incomes exceeds 
tax expenditures and the incentive is fiscally 
efficient. 
Social impact of the tax incentives is to be 
seen in the increase of the standard of living of 
the population, the preservation and develop-
ment of socially significant spheres of activity, 
the formation of favorable living conditions for 
vulnerable categories of the population, preserv-
ing and creating jobs. The demonstration of this 
effect for the area is clear, but it precise quanti-
fication is difficult. There are two main reasons 
for this. 
First, it is necessary to separate this effect 
from the overall natural background of increas-
ing living standards and improving social well-
being of the population area, which is difficult to 
do, because in this area several companies may 
exist (and benefits they receive, of course, can 
be different) that form this effect. But the main 
analyzed error causes the possibility of achiev-
ing this effect by the means of the social pro-
gram financed by the budget system.  
Secondly, there is no single indicator of 
the population social well-being of a territory, 
increase of which over the natural level could be 
evaluated in relation to the social effect of the 
action of any additional stimulus in the area. Of 
course, there are integral factors of the United 
Nations (UN) like "index of quality of life" and 
"human development index", but they are sup-
ported only in the cross-country dimension. 
These indicators are not calculated by the statis-
tical authorities of the municipality and the re-
gion. Here it is necessary to use a range of well-
known indicators of the population life quality 
of the area interactively.  
Thus, the accurate calculation of the so-
cial impact is difficult. For some incentives 
purely focused on production, this effect will be 
almost absent (for example, exemption from the 
value added tax on the importing to the Russian 
territory of process equipment analogues which 
are not produced in Russia is not accompanied 
by any noticeable social impact). In this case, 
the social effect of such incentives will be zero. 
For an approximate estimation of the socially 
orientated incentives we can offer two ap-
proaches. 
The 1st basic approach. If for the social 
orientation incentives it is possible to set appro-
priate territorial social indicators (for example, 
giving tax preferences on disabled persons labor 
will be well correlated with indicators of dis-
abled persons employment and wages levels of 
persons with disabilities), then the analyzed ef-
fect of social incentives should be assessed in 
relation to the dynamics of cost estimations of 
these parameters. This dynamic will adequately 
reflect the effect of the tax incentives under the 
terms of constant budget financing of relevant 
social programs. If a significant change in the 
budget financing takes place it is necessary to 
carry out appropriate correction of the increase 
of indicators. As a result, the social effect can be 
represented as a result of the excess of social 
indicators in terms of providing incentives for 
the period t over the corresponding indicators in 
its absence. The social effect will take place un-
der the condition that the occurred difference 
exceeds the amount of tax expenses over the 
period:  
1
t
t
i
Se TE

 . 
If a positive difference is absent the budg-
et will benefit from achieving this effect using 
the money that must come in the form of tax 
when the tax incentive is absent. 
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l w il
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Se SI SI
 
    
where Se – social impact of the tax incentives; 
1
t
t
l
t
SI

 – total cost estimations of social 
indicators, calculated in terms when incentives 
are provided for the period of t years; 
t – the period of time from the introduc-
tion to the end of the action of the effect of this 
incentive; 
/
1
t
t
w l
t
SI

 – total cost estimates of social in-
dicators, calculated in terms of absence of the 
incentive for the period of t years. 
The 2nd auxiliary approach. When a 
strict correspondence between social indicators 
and social orientation incentives is difficult to 
define (in particular, when the dynamics of so-
cial indicators determines the unidirectional ef-
fect of not one but several benefits) it is neces-
sary to calculate the social effect for several in-
centives, and then divide it by the number of 
incentives that form it. 
/
1 1 ,
t t
t t
l w l
i i
SI SI
Se
n
 


 
 
where n  – number of incentives forming the 
social effect. 
Social efficiency of the tax incentive is the 
ratio of the social impact of the provision of in-
centives received in the period t, when the real 
effect of the action of this incentive appears to 
the amount of tax expenditures over the same 
period t. 
/
1 1
.
1 1
,
t t
t t
l w l
i i
soc t tt t
i i
SI SI
Se
Ef
TE TE
 
 

 
 
 
 
where .socEf  – social efficiency of tax incentive; 
1
tt
i
TE

  – tax expenditures over the peri- 
od t. 
If Ef soc < 1, then analyzed tax incentives 
are socially inefficient. If Ef soc = 1, so this in-
centive is socially neutral. And if Ef soc > 1,  
the increase of social indicators exceeds tax  
expenditures and the incentive is socially effi-
cient. 
The economic effect of the tax incentives 
becomes evident in the form of growing finan-
cial resources of the taxpayer that are at his dis-
posal due to the absence of the need to transfer 
the funds to the state budget in the form of taxes. 
This can significantly improve the financial 
condition of the enterprise, by giving it a higher 
paying ability and liquidity to solve the prob-
lems of rapid modernization of fixed assets, to 
increase profits, etc. The effect can be seen in 
the outperformance of fixed investment, in ex-
pansion and upgrading of production and tech-
nology in order to increase the volumes of pro-
duction of competitive products and create new 
jobs (including upgraded) and in the profits in-
crease. 
The economic effect is increasing of the 
following economic indicators taxpayers who 
use this incentive over current tax expenditures 
for this incentive. It is proposed to use the 
amount of working capital as a result economic 
indicator. This indicator is supported by the state 
statistics and called "organizations turnover". 
The organizations turnover include the cost of 
shipped goods of own production, works and 
services performed in-house, as well as revenue 
from the sale of previously acquired on the side 
of the goods (excluding VAT, excise duties and 
similar payments). 
The excess of this indicator is understood 
as the difference between the sum of enterprises 
sales, calculated in terms of providing incentives 
to the period of appearance of the real effect of 
the action of the incentives, and the sum of or-
ganizations sales in the absence of incentives in 
a period of the same duration before its intro-
duction. All indicators are calculated for the pe-
riod t, thus they should be discounted to a single 
period of time. If the desired value is positive 
and exceeds the sum of tax expenditures, the 
provision of this incentive has an economic ef-
fect, otherwise – no:  
1
t
t
i
Ee TE

 . 
/
1 1
,
tt t
t t
l w l
i i
Ee OT OT
 
    
where Ee – economic effect of the tax benefits; 
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1
t
t
l
t
OT

 – turnover of organizations using 
this incentive, calculated in terms of providing 
benefits for the period of time of t years; 
t – the period of time from the introduc-
tion to the end of the action of the effect of this 
incentive; 
/
1
t
t
w l
i
OT

 – Turnover of organizations us-
ing this incentive, calculated in the absence of 
incentives for the period of time of t years. 
The economic efficiency of the tax incen-
tives is the ratio the economic effect from the 
provision of incentives received in the period t, 
when the real effect of the action of this incen-
tive appears to the sum of tax expenditures of 
the same period t. 
/
1 1
1 1
,
t t
t t
l w l
i i
econ t tt t
i i
OT OT
Ee
Ef
TE TE
 
 

 
 
 
 
where econEf – economic efficiency of the tax 
incentives; 
1
tt
i
TE

  – tax expenditures on this incen-
tive of the period t. 
If Ef econ < 1, then the analyzed tax incen-
tives are economically inefficient. If Ef econ = 1, 
then the increase of economic indicators is equal 
to tax expenditures, so this incentive is econom-
ically neutral. And if Ef econ > 1, the increase of 
economic indicators exceeds the tax expendi-
tures and the incentive is economically efficient. 
Budgetary effect of tax incentives is evi-
dent not only in the future increase in budget 
revenues generated through the expansion of the 
tax base as a result of the incentive, but also in a 
saving of the budget funds spent previously on 
solving social and economic problems that due 
to the exemption companies have to solve them-
selves. Thus as a result of the incentives there 
are additional budget funds that can be spent on 
the most territories of the country. These addi-
tional budget money is a result of the increase in 
tax revenue, i.e. budget revenues and budget 
savings during the realization of some socio-
economic tasks, i.e. expenditures. 
Part of the budgetary effect consists of an 
increase of tax receipts, i.e. budget revenue is a 
fiscal effect. If the budget savings are consi-
dered from the standpoint of alternative costs, 
i.e. consider budget subsidies granted by the 
budget of businesses in the absence of incentives 
to address certain socio-economic problems,  
then this economy can be regarded as the ap-
proximation of the sum of social and economic 
effects. As a result, it can be said that the budget 
effect includes three previously presented effects 
of the individual terms, and the budgetary effect 
is a kind of integral index, which must be posi-
tive. We offer the following approach to the de-
finition of budgetary effect. 
Budgetary effect of tax incentives may be 
represented as the sum of the fiscal, social and 
economic effects, and if any of these effects is 
negative, it will decrease the budgetary effect. 
However, the most important characteristics of 
budgetary effect should be a comparison of the 
sum of all growth indicators (income tax, social 
indicators, organizations turnover) obtained dur-
ing the period t, when the real effect of the ac-
tion of this incentives takes place with the 
amount of tax expenditures for the same period 
t. In our opinion, we should not calculate the 
arithmetic average of these effects, they need to 
be just summarized. 
So, if the sum of these effects exceeds tax 
expenditures, the budgetary effect is present, if 
less - no. Incentive will be effective if the bud-
getary effect exceeds the effect of tax expendi-
tures 
1
t
t
i
Be TE

  
/
1 1
/ /
1 1 1 1
,
t t
t t
l w l
i i
t t t t
t t t t
l w l l w l
i i i i
Be Fe Se Ee TI TI
SI SI OT OT
 
   
     
   
 
   
 
where Be – budgetary effect of tax incentives. 
Budget efficiency of tax incentive is the 
ratio of the sums of fiscal, social and economic 
effects from granting the incentives received in 
the period t, when the real effect of the action 
appears to the tax expenditures of the same pe-
riod t. Again, the specific nature of the integral 
indicator is that we are not dealing with the 
arithmetic average of the three types of efficien-
cies, we relate to the sum of the effects from tax 
expenditures. 
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where budEf – budget efficiency of the tax incen-
tive. 
 
If Ef bud < 1, then analyzed tax incentives 
are budgetary inefficient. If Ef bud = 1, then the 
increase of all indicators is equal to tax expendi-
tures, so this incentive is budgetary neutral. And 
if Ef bud > 1, the increase of all indicators ex-
ceeds tax expenditures and the incentive is bud-
getary efficient. 
The allocation of the environmental ef-
fects is the controversial question. On the one 
hand, the process of active development of envi-
ronmental taxation in all countries indicates that 
it is necessary to allocate, as well as, the search-
ing of adequate tax incentives for reproduction 
of environmentally oriented behavior of taxpay-
ers. On the other hand, complex quantitative 
estimate of this effect can be done only in pers-
pective but not in the nearest future. 
But it should be noted that the allocation 
of environmental effects is necessary, it requires 
by realities. Contents of environmental impact 
should be reflected in reduced damage to the 
environment and human health. In our opinion, 
the evaluation of this effect should be made on 
two parameters. There are amounts of avoided 
environmental damage and improvement of 
health of population. 
In conclusion it should be noted that each 
of the indicators of the tax incentives efficiency 
(fiscal, social, economic) can serve as a criterion 
by which one can estimate the efficiency (or 
inefficiency) of any incentives. The presence of 
even one type of the effect, i.e. exceeding of the 
increase of any type of indicators over tax ex-
penditures (i.e. a positive effect) allows us to 
assume that this exemption is effective. But only 
the budget efficiency can be the integral index, 
as it accumulates the three other efficiencies. 
When one of the effects from the incentives can 
be seen clearly, this incentive has to be consi-
dered effective. In this case we have a positive 
effect, for example, the fiscal or social. It is like-
ly that the budgetary effect would be positive 
also. Much more complicated is the case with 
incentives having an impact on several areas of 
activity. In this case, each of the effects (fiscal, 
social, economic) may not be as great and may 
seem vague. And the individual growth of all 
kinds of indicators will not exceed the tax ex-
penditures, but in the aggregate the value of the 
total increase of these parameters may exceed 
the tax expenditures. Therefore, this exemption 
should also be considered effective. 
Thus, the indicator of fiscal efficiency has to 
make sense as the final criterion indicator, bas-
ing on the positive value of which the efficiency 
of the relevant incentives is stated. 
 
Directions for further research. To find 
a successful solution to the problem stated by 
the Russian Government it is necessary first of 
all to work out theoretically the full range of 
problems associated with the use of tax incen-
tives in Russia: 
to form a new understanding of the tax in-
centives; 
to develop a normative structure for all 
taxes; 
to identify the whole range of deviations 
from the normative structure as tax expendi-
tures; 
to develop a qualimetry methodology for 
these tax expenditures; 
to develop a methodology of efficiency 
assession assessment of the tax expenditure im-
plementation; 
to develop new approaches to a statistical 
state-supported indicators and statistic reports. 
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